Working Papers
Job market paper and working papers.
2026
- Progressive Taxation and Dynamic Wealth Inequality under Luxury SavingArashk Afshar2026Job Market Paper
Wealth inequality has risen across the developed world for four decades, through repeated rounds of progressive taxation. This paper offers one reason why. When saving is a luxury good, so that the rich set aside a rising share of their wealth, the distribution widens on its own, and a tax can compress it at every date while the sequence of distributions still pulls apart. Reducing inequality at a moment and reducing it over time turn out to be different problems, and the criterion economists use was built for the first. Income taxes cannot touch the second, whatever their rates. A wealth tax can, because it is levied again on what accumulation produced, but whether it does is a quantitative question the static criterion does not answer: I give an example in which the tax compresses the distribution in both periods and the sequence diverges anyway. The instruments were designed for a snapshot; the problem is a trajectory.
- The Myth of the Informed VoterArashk Afshar2026Working paper
Campaign spending shapes elections by directing attention rather than by supplying information. Money cannot change what voters believe, only what they weigh, so even a fully informed electorate can be decided by which issues are made salient. Under unlimited spending, each candidate concentrates on the issue they own most strongly, and the owner of the loudest issue wins, however narrow their support elsewhere. A binding cap breaks that concentration and forces competition across many issues at once; whether the broadly supported candidate then prevails depends on the structure of the electorate. Money decides elections by setting what the election is about.
- Progressive Taxation and Wealth Inequality with Forward-Looking SaversArashk Afshar2026Work in progress
My job market paper shows that when saving is a luxury good, progressive taxation carries no guarantee that wealth inequality falls over time. That paper’s agents are myopic, choosing period by period, and the natural objection is that the failure is an artifact of the assumption. This paper drops myopia. Agents who anticipate what saving earns them save harder still, so the divergence is stronger rather than weaker. The tax problem also changes shape. A bracketed schedule kinks the intertemporal budget set, agents bunch at the thresholds, and what governs behavior is the marginal rate rather than the average. Containing the divergence then requires marginal-rate progressivity, a stricter standard than the average-rate progressivity that suffices at a single date.